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An essential component of initiatives that aim to address pervasive
inequalities of any kind is the ability to collect empirical evidence
of both the status quo baseline and of any improvement that can
be attributed to prescribed and deployed interventions. Unfortu-
nately, two substantial barriers can arise preventing the collection
and analysis of such empirical evidence: (1) the sensitive nature
of the data itself and (2) a lack of technical sophistication and in-
frastructure available to both an initiative’s beneficiaries and to
those spearheading it. In the last few years, it has been shown that
a cryptographic primitive called secure multi-party computation
(MPC) can provide a natural technological resolution to this co-
nundrum. MPC allows an otherwise disinterested third party to
contribute its technical expertise and resources, to avoid incurring
any additional liabilities itself, and (counterintuitively) to reduce the
level of data exposure that existing parties must accept to achieve
their data analysis goals. However, achieving these benefits requires
the deliberate design of MPC tools and frameworks whose level
of accessibility to non-technical users with limited infrastructure
and expertise is state-of-the-art. We describe our own experiences
designing, implementing, and deploying such usable web applica-
tions for secure data analysis within the context of two real-world
initiatives that focus on promoting economic equality.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Privacy-preserving protocols; Human
and societal aspects of security and privacy; • Information systems
→ Information systems applications;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Initiatives that aim to address pervasive inequalities within a par-
ticular context or of a particular kind (such as wage inequality
across race and gender, or inequality of opportunity for women-
and minority-owned small businesses) often face an uphill battle
due to a variety of factors. One way such an initiative can introduce
a level of rigor and legitimacy is by attaining the ability to collect
and analyze empirical evidence of both the status quo baseline for
relevant metrics, as well as any improvements in those metrics
over time that can be attributed to interventions that are being
investigated, prescribed, or administered as part of the initiative.
Paradoxically, the very same root cause being addressed by the
initiative can introduce substantial or even insurmountable ethical,
legal, and institutional barriers to such an evidence-based approach.
This quandary can be understood and examined by taking in-
ventory of the parties involved, their concerns, their incentives,
and the capabilities and resources available to them. In a typical
scenario, an initiative involves at least two kinds of entities: the
population of initiative beneficiaries, and the organizations that are
spearheading the initiative with the purpose of collectively finding
solutions. Both kinds of entities may be disincentivized to collect
and analyze data. Beneficiaries may be unwilling to reveal sensitive
data to the initiative; this may be especially true for beneficiaries
that are members of a vulnerable population and do not want their
data collected by third-party organizations. Initiative leaders may
be concerned that collection and analysis of data that measures such
inequalities might expose participants (or themselves) to negative
publicity or risk of litigation. All parties may fear that inadvertent
data exposure may be harmful (to beneficiaries, to participant orga-
nizations, and to the viability of the initiative as a whole) and that
the liability associated with housing it is too burdensome.
Additionally, initiative leaders may not possess the technical
skills and resources needed to effect a secure data collection and
analysis workflow (e.g., they may be individuals from non-technical
fields, human resources departments, social scientists, non-profits,
government organizations, and so on). The initiative may have
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to resort to using a third party that is tasked with building the
appropriate system for securely collecting and storing the data,
as well as with performing the desired analytics. However, this
requires that all entities strongly trust this third party, presents yet
another security risk, and may be costly if the third party wishes to
be compensated for incurring liability on its own end. Additionally,
this may further disincentivize beneficiaries from participating,
since their sensitive data will be revealed to this third party.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic prim-
itive for building privacy-preserving analytics over private data.
MPC federates data collection and analysis among different parties
so that results may be calculated and delivered while preserving the
confidentiality of each contributor’s data. Theoretical constructs
for MPC have been known for more than 35 years [4, 18, 32, 37];
performance improvements and software implementations in the
past decade confirm their feasibility [7, 24, 30, 33, 36]. Available
frameworks vary in the maturity of their software implementations,
their security guarantees [29], and their communication models
(i.e., peer-to-peer or client-server). Additionally, MPC has been de-
ployed to promote socially desirable outcomes such as fair auctions
[8], tax fraud detection [6], and disease surveillance [16].
In the last few years, MPC solutions have been utilized suc-
cessfully to provide a resolution to the conundrum faced by such
initiatives. MPC allows otherwise disinterested third parties to con-
tribute their technical expertise and resources without being privy
to the input data or the results of the analysis. Thus, beneficiaries
no longer need to trust the third party and the third party can avoid
incurring any additional liabilities. However, achieving MPC’s ben-
efits within initiatives that aim to address inequalities requires the
deliberate design of highly accessible MPC tools and frameworks.
Our contributions. In this paper, we report our experiences de-
signing, implementing, and successfully deploying web-based se-
cure computation frameworks that support two real-world initia-
tives relying on secure data analysis and promoting economic equal-
ity: pay equity and business spending on local, minority-owned
businesses. Our frameworks were informed by the interconnected
usability, security, and legal requirements of the pay equity applica-
tion and subsequently adapted to a second use case, demonstrating
the ease of generalizing the frameworks to a variety of scenarios.
Our applications and frameworks are distinguished from those
used in prior deployments of MPC in that they must drive partici-
pation via their usability and accessibility from the perspective of
non-technical users with limited computational resources (i.e., web
browsers): users do not need to download an application package
or configure a web server. The frameworks also explicitly support
introducing resource asymmetries into secure data analysis proto-
cols (in terms of the computations each party must perform). Thus,
analysis applications can let resource-rich parties contribute their
computational resources to do the heavy lifting, can let resource-
constrained parties perform as little computation as possible, and
can maintain desired security guarantees throughout the analysis.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND RELATEDWORK
Secure MPC allows several parties to learn the output of a shared
function while guaranteeing that all inputs remain private even
against a colluding coalition of malicious parties. MPC relies on
a “secret-sharing” step in which the private input data of a par-
ticipant is split into multiple shares (i.e., pieces that on their own
are indistinguishable from random noise), and each share is then
sent to one of the participating parties. MPC provides generic pro-
tocols that transform any typical data analysis program into an
equivalent distributed version that operates on the secret shares;
each stage of this program (when executed in a distributed manner
across all parties) produces a new set of secret shares that represent
the intermediate result. At the end, the secret shares of the final
output(s) are sent out to the designated parties to allow them to
reconstruct the final result. MPC provides mathematically rigorous
security guarantees that ensure that (1) the initial input remains
private throughout the computation because any subset of parties
only sees shares of it and (2) participants can be certain that the
distributed MPC protocol was executed correctly by all parties.
The past several years have seen several successful deployments
of MPC [6, 8, 13] and the creation of various software frameworks
for MPC development and deployment. These framework range
from proprietary implementations [7, 23] to open-source, proof-
of-concept work [3, 9, 14, 15, 24, 26, 30, 36]. They can be divided
into two settings: peer-to-peer and client-server. The peer-to-peer
setting assumes symmetry in the capabilities and roles of all par-
ticipating parties: all parties must deploy the software framework
on continuously available servers, must remain online throughout
protocol execution, and must perform the same amount of compu-
tation and communication. Most frameworks in this category are
open-source research prototypes In many cases, the framework’s
authors explicitly discourage use in production [14, 24, 26, 30, 36].
In the client-server model, one entity acts as a service provider
and the other parties can be resource-constrained clients. Unfor-
tunately, this setting has received less attention in the community,
with the few available frameworks limited in their flexibility. Work
by Schröpfer et al. [31] allows two clients to perform a secure two-
party computation using browsers while leveraging a web server for
communication and code delivery. The framework is closed-source
and restricted to two parties. Canon-MPC [19] offers a web-based
system that supports MPC with symmetric binary functions. How-
ever, Canon-MPC’s code is delivered as a compiled binary and runs
in Google’s proprietary NativeClient, which reduces accessibility
and auditability. Canon-MPC also forces all parties to actively par-
ticipate in the computation and may require an additional round to
finish the session if some parties did not submit data.
Existing MPC frameworks fall short of supporting our setting
along one or more of three critical dimensions: low-resource com-
puting, accessibility, and usability. Initiative participants often do
not possess adequate computational resources or technical exper-
tise, particularly in cases where beneficiaries are members of under-
served communities. This is especially problematic because MPC
protocols are computationally more expensive than non-secure
counterparts and require technical expertise to design and deploy.
Successful MPC solutions must be accessible to beneficiaries and
must not require any setup (e.g., they must run within a browser as
typical web applications) or specialized software or hardware de-
pendencies. These requirements influenced the design of our MPC
frameworks, which are, to the best of our knowledge, the only MPC
frameworks that are deployed in a low-resource user community.
We discuss these requirements in greater detail in Section 3.
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3 ACCESSIBLE MPC FRAMEWORKS
Successful MPC-enabled data analysis applications must satisfy
certain requirements in order to drive participation from data con-
tributors [5]. These requirements are particularly critical in the
context of societal initiatives serving communities that have lim-
ited technical resources and expertise. Computational asymmetry:
the stakeholders in an initiative may require assistance from third
parties because they must perform as little computation as possible
on their end. Solutions should allow expensive parts of the compu-
tation to be delegated to the third parties without compromising the
security of the computation. Asynchronicity: resource constraints
may make it impossible for certain parties to be online throughout
the computation. Such parties should be able to join and leave a
computation at any time while relying on third parties to keep
the service available throughout. In our applications, only a single
entity (a service provider) must remain online; all other parties can
contribute inputs once and remain offline during the rest of the anal-
ysis computation. Idempotence: contributors must be able to update
their data if they discover the data they submitted was corrupted
due to human error or software failures. Additionally, parties with
more technical resources and expertise should be able to leverage
these resources and expertise to help recover from failures and
data corruption events without being able to observe or access any
of the original input data. Accessibility: software solutions must
be easily deployable, and should require no setup or specialized
software or hardware dependencies. In our applications, users only
require a web browser. Comprehensibility: MPC protocols must be
simple enough to explain to potential users who do not possess
technical knowledge, so that initiative leaders and beneficiaries can
be confident in the security guarantees of the analysis.
3.1 Web-MPC Data Aggregation Framework
Web-MPC [35] leverages a variant [22] of standard additive secret
sharing [10] to enable data analyses that do not require data con-
tributors to reveal their data. This protocol allows a large number
parties with limited computational resources to aggregate their
data with the help of at least one party that can operate a web
server. Web-MPC supports aggregate analysis of tabular numeric
data (supplied by users in the familiar format of a spreadsheet as
shown in Figure 1) and responses to multiple-choice questions. Cor-
relations between responses to multiple-choice questions can also
be aggregated using the same additive secret sharing approach.
The protocol utilized by Web-MPC groups participating entities
into three main roles:
• contributors who submit their private data for computation;
• the service provider that performs computations necessary
for the analysis without being able to observe any of the
individual inputs (in our deployment scenarios, this role was
assumed by our institution);
• the analyzer who receives the result of the analysis compu-
tation (in our scenarios, these are the organizations spear-
heading their respective initiatives).
The described architecture was informed by the resource limitations
of both the BWWC and the initiative participants [5]. In addition to
its reliance on additive secret sharing, the security of the protocol
leverages standard public-key encryption schemes that provide
IND-CPA security; concretely, RSA is used in the implementation
[25]. The protocol is secure in the honest-but-curious model [17]:
the service provider’s view of the random masks is protected using
the analyzer’s public key and the analyzer never sees the individual
masked data values unless it violates its promise not to collude
with the service provider. The honest-but-curious model is appro-
priate when the service provider and analyzer have no incentives
to collude (e.g., if both are vested in an initiative’s success).
3.2 JavaScript Implementation of Federated
Functionalities (JIFF)
JIFF [34] is a general-purposeMPC framework that generalizesWeb-
MPC along two dimensions: (1) it supports arbitrary computations
(as opposed to only aggregation) and (2) it allows designers to
customize an application to match the specific resource profiles
of participants by defining the roles they play in the computation
[21]. JIFF utilizes a server to store and route encrypted messages
sent between the various participating parties. The server may
also participate in the computation itself to improve performance
and usability. The library supports asynchronous and asymmetric
computations: parties are not required to remain online throughout
the computation, can leave and join a computation dynamically,
and can execute customized portions of the computation according
to their resources and roles. JIFF assumes the honest-but-curious
security model, and uses threshold Shamir’s Secret Sharing [32]. It
is compatible with browsers and can run as a Node.js application.
4 APPLICATIONS
4.1 100% Talent Compact
In 2013, Boston Mayor Thomas Menino established a taskforce to
advance the interests of women in the workforce, leading to the
creation of the Boston Women’s Workforce Council (BWWC) by
Mayor Marty Walsh in 2014. The BWWC initiated the 100% Talent
Compact to partner with local government and private businesses
in addressing issues impacting women in the workplace. Partici-
pating companies were required to help analyze wage gaps [12]
by anonymously reporting salary data broken down by gender,
ethnicity, and level of employment (similarly to the standard EEO-1
form [11]). Initially, no third party was willing to undertake the
risk of receiving the raw salary data in order to enable the analysis.
In theory, the City of Boston or BWWC could have implemented
an MPC solution such as Web-MPC on their own. However, they
lacked the software engineering resources to build and deploy a
platform, and did not posses the subject-area expertise needed to ex-
plain or execute the cryptographic protocol. The comprehensibility
of the additive secret sharing protocol used by Web-MPC played a
critical role in our and BWWC’s ability to explain to non-technical
participants that each company could contribute cumulative em-
ployee earnings to the city-wide analysis, that our institution could
provide and manage the computational resources and MPC data
analysis application, and that only aggregate data would be revealed
by the output. Prior work discusses our experiences communicating
with participating organizations about the protocol’s capabilities
[5, 22]. Ultimately, the BWWC was able to analyze aggregate data
across companies while keeping company-specific data private
during three successful deployments in 2015, 2016, and 2017.
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Figure 1: Web-MPC user interface at https://100talent.org.
In 2017, the BWWCwas able to analyze aggregate data represent-
ing 166,705 employees across 114 companies, comprising roughly
16% of the Greater Boston area workforce. The data showed that
the gender gap in the Boston area is even larger than previously
estimated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Their analysis con-
cluded that white women were earning 75 cents relative to every
dollar that a white man earns. Asian women, black women, and
Hispanic women made 71, 52, and 49 cents, respectively relative to
every dollar made by a white male. The full report [12] documents
in more detail the nuances of the study. By having actual employer-
reported wage data, these results are a more accurate reflection of
the magnitude of the salary inequities in the Greater Boston area.
Since these analyses will be repeated at regular intervals, broad
comparisons can be made from from year to year. The analysis also
enables granular insights into how employees of different races and
job categories are affected by wage inequities. These outcomes are
then used by the BWWC to drive discussions and workshops aimed
at helping advance women of all backgrounds in the workplace.
4.2 Pacesetters Initiative
The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce (GBCC) launched the
Pacesetters Initiative [28] in January 2018 [27]. This initiative aims
to leverage the purchasing power of large and mid-sized companies
to create and promote economic opportunities for local minority-
owned businesses. By tracking spending patterns and awarded
contracts of participating members over time, the GBCC can mea-
sure the initiative’s impact on supplier diversity practices, including
ways to increase spending with minority-owned businesses.
During a one-week period in March 2018, nine Pacesetters partic-
ipated in the data analysis effort. We enabled the aggregation of four
data points measuring spend and interactions with local minority-
owned businesses; these were later shared by the GBCC with ini-
tiative participants. The Pacesetters Initiative will continue to pro-
mote equitable spending for minority-owned businesses amongst
its members, and these initial results will be used as a baseline to
which future analyses can be compared to assess progress.
For this initiative, we deployed a modified version of the Web-
MPC platform that was used in the 100% Talent Compact data
analysis. After the many training and feedback sessions we held
with participants, we customized the user interface to better accom-
modate the definitions and number of data points to be analyzed.
A large amount of time and effort was spent to ensure every par-
ticipant felt comfortable interacting with the system. Due to the
anonymity guarantees of MPC, mistakes made by any individual
affect the overall analysis results in an irreversible way and re-
covering from incorrect data submissions is non-trivial (and often
impossible). Nevertheless, during the collection it became clear that
at least one of the data contributors ran into a limitation of our
platform. The upper bound for input values was 232 − 1, which
caused an error for one of the participants. We were able to recover
from this problem without violating the privacy of all the other
submissions (and by learning no additional information about the
affected participant other than this lower bound) by changing the
finite additive group used for additive secret sharing to Z/240Z
in the middle of the analysis session. This was accomplished by
rebuilding all secret shares under MPC using the general-purpose
features of JIFF. While this unexpected issue leaked the lower bound
of a data point for one participant, we note that this lower bound
can be inferred from publicly available earnings reports.
Future analyses are planned at six month intervals, growing the
group of Pacesetters as the initiative continues. One future goal is
to perform a more granular analysis to better understand how to
improve diversity spending, going beyond simple aggregation to
more advanced statistical methods running under MPC.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
By designing accessible MPC-enabled data analysis libraries and
applications, we have allowed a third party (our institution) to
contribute its resources to empirical studies of inequality without
compromising the privacy of data contributors. Our work has re-
ceived public praise from the BWWC. Speaking on NPR’s OnPoint,
BWWC co-chair Evelyn Murphy stated that our framework consti-
tutes a first step in “show[ing] how to use sophisticated computer
science research for public programs” [1]. Christina Knowles, ex-
ecutive director of the BWWC [2, 20]: “[We] spent more than a
year brainstorming with global experts in fruitless pursuit of a data-
gathering method that would ensure employers’ confidentiality. It
proved impossible to find a solution — until we were introduced to
[the authors] who [were] absolutely vital to our work. The project
is the first of its kind in the country and we owe our progress on
this innovative and groundbreaking project [to them].”
A framework for privacy-preserving web-based data analysis
that properly balances security and usability has far-reaching po-
tential for public initiative research studies. Government agencies,
non-profit organizations, and social scientists can identify analyt-
ics with social value and address legal and economic barriers to
participation, while software engineers and security experts can de-
sign a technically sound data analysis application combining cloud
computing and thin clients (even if vulnerability of participants
is inversely proportional to computing power). Many potentially
interesting avenues of research lie ahead in working to understand
and model how the availability and accessibility of contemporary
cryptographic techniques such as MPC changes the incentives, con-
cerns, and limitations within the research and policy landscape.
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